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What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their Checking and Credit
Card Accounts? Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs
By Victor Stango and Jonathan Zinman*
Consumers in the United States make billions
of transactions each year using cash, checks,
debit cards, and credit cards. Bank and credit
card accounts provide consumers with liquidity
to clear and settle these transactions. In return,
consumers pay a variety of fees, and both explicit
and implicit interest charges.
The importance of retail banking and credit
markets to economic activity drives interest in
many open policy and research questions. Do
households borrow too much relative to a neoclassical benchmark (Christopher D. Carroll
2001)? Why do many households leave a substantial amount of money on the table in managing
their accounts (Sumit Agarwal et al. 2006; David
Gross and Nicholas Souleles 2002)? Do firms
structure pricing to exploit consumer cognitive
biases or limitations (Stefano DellaVigna and
Ulrike Malmendier 2004; Xavier Gabaix and
David Laibson 2006)? How do learning (Sumit
Agarwal, John Driscoll, and Gabaix 2008) and
disclosure regulation (Stango and Zinman 2009b)
interact with consumer decision making and firm
strategy to determine market outcomes?
This paper examines some threshold questions that should inform the questions above:
what do people really pay to use their bank and
credit card accounts, and which cost components
are the largest? Of all the costs that people pay,
which could they easily avoid by making different day-to-day choices? And how stable are both
the level of costs and the share of costs that are
“avoidable,” for a given person over time?

To answer these questions, we use novel
administrative data containing every checking and credit card account transaction made
by 917 consumers (households) over two years.
We measure total explicit and implicit costs
that consumers pay across all of their bank and
credit card accounts and describe the relative
importance of each total cost component. We
then measure the costs that consumers could
avoid by making different decisions, and measure how stable costs and avoidable costs are for
consumers month to month.
Compared to national averages, our sample
uses electronic payments relatively intensively,
has typical amounts of revolving debt, and is
younger, wealthier, more educated, more likely
to manage finances online, and more creditworthy. In short, our sample is likely to be relatively
financially sophisticated.
In our sample, the median household pays
$43 in total bank and credit card account costs
per month. The twenty-fifth percentile pays $13
per month, while the seventy-fifth pays $111 per
month, and the ninetieth percentile pays $257
($3,084 per year). For most consumers who
pay economically significant costs, credit card
interest is the largest component of total costs.
Many consumers pay checking account fees per
month that are zero or close to zero, and forgo
little interest by holding bank account balances.
There are serial payers of fees: among those with
nonzero average overdraft fees per month, the
seventy-fifth percentile is nearly $20 per month.
Among those who pay some credit card late or
overlimit fees, the seventy-fifth percentiles are
$12 and $16 per month. But more than half of
our panelists never pay penalty fees.
For those who do pay significant fees and
credit card interest, a large share of costs could
be avoided relatively easily. At the median,
almost half of credit card interest could be
avoided by a combination of reallocating from
high- to low-rate cards, and repaying debt using
available checking balances. Among those who
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and the Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City, Philadelphia,
and Richmond for comments, and to the FDIC Center for
Financial Research, the Filene Research Institute, and the
Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth for funding.
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overdraft their bank accounts, nearly all could
have avoided fees by using a much cheaper source
of liquidity (usually a credit card with available
credit). Most credit card late and overlimit fees
could be avoided by either paying a bill using
available checking balances, or by using a different card with sufficient available credit. In all,
the median panelist could avoid 60 percent of all
credit card interest charges, overdraft fees, and
overlimit and late fees through such behavior.
Another way to scale avoidable costs is to equate
them to a “consumption cost”—the additional
amount one could borrow, without any increase
in the monthly interest payment, by allocating
payment choices more efficiently. This consumption cost exceeds $1,000 for most panelists.
For most panelists, the month-to-month level
of credit card interest costs and the share of
them that could be avoided are fairly persistent:
both autocorrelations are around 0.50. Fee costs
and their avoidability are less strongly autocorrelated, and negatively so for many panelists.
What drives costs, avoidable costs, or their persistence is not something that we try to explain
in this paper. Precautionary demand, rational
inattention under bounded rationality, mental
accounting, and shrouded attributes are among
the leading potential explanations we explore in
Stango and Zinman (2009a). Here we take the
first step of establishing some stylized facts.
I. The Data

Our data come from Lightspeed Research
(formerly Forrester Research) in 2006 and 2007
as part of its comprehensive consumer panel.
Panelists have typically participated in other
Lightspeed surveys and enter the sample by providing Lightspeed with access to online bank
(checking, savings, or time deposit) and credit
card accounts held by their household. The primary pieces of the dataset are monthly statement data “pulled” from each account, daily
transaction information “scraped” from each
account’s transaction listing page, and account
information scraped periodically from other
account pages (such as the one listing “terms”).
A second important piece of data is registration information collected when the consumer
enrolls in the panel. That data includes some
standard demographics (income, education,
etc.), self-reports on account holding and use,
and some credit bureau data.
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To enroll in the panel, a household must register at least two accounts of any type, but can
register many more. Because the registration
information also includes the panelist’s active
deposit and credit card accounts, we can construct a subsample of panelists registering the
full set of checking and credit card accounts
held by their household.1 Below we report results
for 917 panelists who meet the full-set criterion,
register at least one deposit and one credit card
account (which may be at different banks), and
are in the sample for nine months or more.
Observing the full set of accounts is critical for estimating avoidable costs, because
avoidability is a function of other options. The
Lightspeed data have several advantages over
other datasets that might be used to study highfrequency transaction and borrowing behavior.
Administrative data from a single financial
institution typically lacks the customer’s full
choice set and much of the supplemental data we
observe from Lightspeed’s surveys. More standard household surveys (such as the Survey of
Consumer Finances) lack comprehensive highfrequency financial information, and may suffer
from reporting biases (Zinman, forthcoming).
The main disadvantage of the Lightspeed data
is that they are not nationally representative.
The requirement that panelists register accounts
online selects younger and relatively educated
people, who therefore have high income conditional on age. Panelists are necessarily those
who are willing to share sensitive financial
information (in exchange for the compensation
they get for participating), although household
surveys on consumer finances face this selection
issue as well. (Stango and Zinman (2009a) discuss representativeness issues in greater detail.)
An observation in the raw data is a panelisttransaction. We define “transaction” as anything
that changes an account balance. So retail purchases are transactions, as are finance charges and
fees. For each transaction, we observe transaction-level characteristics (including the date and
dollar amount), the account on which the transaction is made, the panelist making the transaction
and her (largely time-invariant) demographic
1
We can impose the full-set filter using either selfreported account counts from the registration survey or
active line data from the credit bureau file. Both have their
advantages and disadvantages. Here we report results using
the registration survey as the filter.
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characteristics, time-varying account characteristics such as running balance and available
liquidity, running balances and liquidity on all
other accounts held by that panelist, and account
characteristics that change at much lower frequencies such as interest rates and credit limits.
We have 917 panelists registering the full set
of checking and credit card accounts, and 13,060
panelist-months for an average of 14 months
per panelist. These panelists display 722,944
transactions on all of their accounts, of which
416,994 are on deposit accounts and 305,950
are on credit card accounts. Their debit/credit
transaction split is similar to the US average.
The age distribution is skewed toward younger
consumers, although income conditional on age
is higher than the national average. Education
levels are relatively high as well. Average creditworthiness is comparable to the national average, but above average conditional on age.
The average number of checking accounts per
panelist is just over two, and the average number
of credit cards is just over four. Panelists average one “spending” transaction (an accounting
debit) per day, although many make more than
that. Debit and credit card transactions are the
most common type. Other “electronic” transactions (including discretionary and automatic payments) are also fairly common. Our subsample
appears to be less cash-intensive than the population at large, as judged by their ATM usage.
Most consumers concentrate their card purchases almost exclusively on either debit or
credit, particularly over shorter intervals, e.g.,
very few mix card types within a month. By
most measures, our panelists have access to substantial liquidity, either in the form of checking
balances or available credit. The median daily
available checking balance is $1,194, and the
median daily available credit on all cards is
$9,787. Despite carrying high credit card balances, many consumers rarely revolve (borrow)
on their credit cards; the median daily credit card
balance is $2,629, but the median daily revolving balance is $666. At the high end (ninetieth
percentile), daily revolving credit card balances
are close to $20,000.
II. What Consumers Pay:
Explicit and Implicit Costs

Many costs to consumers are explicit and
captured directly from a particular transaction.
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On credit card accounts these include interest charges, annual or monthly fees, late and
overlimit fees, cash advance fees, and balance
transfer fees. On deposit accounts these include
monthly account fees, overdraft fees, ATM fees,
transfer fees, and other fees (e.g., for cashier
checks).
We also measure the implicit (“forgone”)
interest that consumers pay by leaving funds
in deposit accounts, which most often pay
zero interest. We assume that the alternative
is a daily sweep of deposit account funds into
a risk-free investment paying the contemporaneous three-month Treasury Bill rate. For
each panelist we multiply total checking balances by the risk-free rate to get foregone daily
interest; we exclude savings, CD, and MMDA
account balances from that calculation as they
already earn interest. We reduce the base on
which daily interest foregone is calculated by
the amount of revolving credit card debt; in that
case, the explicit interest payments on revolving
debt measure the (opportunity) cost of holding
checking balances.
Credit card users who do not have revolving debt earn implicit interest (“float”) on their
credit card charges. We again calculate this day
by day, using the three-month T-Bill rate to infer
a daily risk-free return.
Summing explicit costs and net implicit costs
yields estimates of the full gross, pecuniary
costs borne by consumers for transaction services and liquidity. We emphasize that we are
simply measuring gross pecuniary costs, not net
benefits in monetized or utility terms. We therefore ignore time and other nonpecuniary costs,
and we also ignore the benefits provided by the
transaction and liquidity services (including risk
mitigation).
Table 1 shows information about the distribution of average total monthly costs (“total
costs”) at the panelist level, and decomposes
those costs. One striking feature of total costs
and its components is the great degree of heterogeneity. The interquartile range of total costs
is [$13.41, $110.71]. The seventy-fifth percentile
pays about 2 percent of pretax household income
for the liquidity provided by its checking and
credit card accounts.
Eighty-five percent of our panelists pay some
explicit credit card cost during our sample
period. The largest explicit cost is typically
credit card interest. Credit card penalty fees (late
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Table 1—Average Monthly Costs of Deposit and Credit Card Accounts
Percentiles among those with nonzero values
Variable

Share of panelists
w/zero

Explicit, credit card:
0.15
Interest paid
0.18
Late fees
0.55
Overlimit fees
0.78
Cash advance fees
0.94
Annual fees
0.70
Other fees
0.91
Explicit, checking account:
0.31
Overdraft fees
0.68
ATM fees
0.56
Other fees
0.51
Implicit:
Credit card float earned
0.14
Checking interest forgone
0.13
Total costs:
0.00
Credit card
0.00
Checking account
0.03
Explicit
0.07
Implicit
0.04
All interest
0.00
Total fees
0.15
Share costs avoidable:
0.00
Interest paid
0.00
Late fees
0.04
Overlimit fees
0.15
Overdraft fees
0.03
Month-to-month correlation within panelist:
All costs
0.00
All fees
0.15
All interest
0.00
Share costs avoidable
0.00
Share fees avoidable
0.15
Share interest avoidable
0.00

25th

50th

75th

90th

10.41
6.67
3.22
3.55
0.56
3.26
3.00
1.10
3.24
0.22
0.75

37.16
29.91
4.89
8.28
1.91
5.91
4.90
4.83
7.33
0.55
2.18

115.14
102.32
11.70
16.31
4.50
10.33
9.90
14.75
18.48
1.50
6.30

246.94
238.72
26.00
26.71
9.44
16.67
12.81
36.31
42.78
3.98
14.78

−0.75
0.41
13.41
−0.29
2.91
11.10
−2.83
6.73
3.88
0.33
0.28
0.80
0.00
0.00

−2.91
2.17
42.65
21.39
8.71
41.98
0.01
24.26
11.44
0.60
0.52
1.00
0.75
0.62

−8.26
8.52
110.71
89.20
21.79
120.43
3.58
76.16
29.50
0.98
0.93
1.00
1.00
1.00

−16.44
25.96
256.58
226.30
45.60
265.60
14.93
211.25
68.72
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.01
−0.14
0.17
−0.04
−0.28
0.21

0.29
−0.06
0.45
0.23
0.00
0.49

0.56
0.24
0.67
0.53
0.58
0.71

0.74
0.50
0.83
0.77
0.80
0.85

Notes: Unless otherwise noted, cells contain per-month average dollar values across the 917 panelists in the subsample.
“Other” fees on credit card accounts include phone transaction fees and other miscellaneous fees. “Other” fees on checking
accounts include monthly account fees, safe deposit box fees, cashier/bank check fees, and other miscellaneous fees. Credit
card float earned is calculated as total credit card debt minus revolving credit card debt times the daily risk-free (three-month
T-Bill) interest rate, summed over the month and averaged across months. Checking balance interest forgone is calculated
using the daily excess of checking balances over revolving credit card debt, and is treated as costing the risk-free rate. For
“share costs avoidable,” five cost components are in the denominator: explicit credit card interest, checking interest forgone,
late fees, overlimit fees, and overdraft fees. The numerator includes the level of those costs that the panelist could avoid in
the following ways. Explicit credit card interest is avoidable via repayment from checking balances or reallocating debt from
high-rate to low-rate cards. Checking interest forgone is avoidable via a daily sweep into an account earning the risk-free rate.
Late fees are avoidable if available checking balances exceeded the minimum monthly payment for every day during the billing period. Overlimit fees are avoidable if the amount over limit was available in checking or on another card during every
day of the billing period. Overdraft fees are avoidable if available liquidity exists on another card (checking or credit).

and overlimit) are also important; 48 percent of
our panelists pay at least one, and many incur
penalties that average more than $10 per month.
Annual fees and cash advance fees are not prevalent in our data.

Explicit checking account fees are far less
important, except for the 32 percent of panelists
who pay at least one overdraft fee. Among these
consumers, the interquartile range of average
monthly overdraft fees is [$3.24, $18.48].
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Implicit interest is not a big benefit or cost at
the median. But, again, the breadth of the distribution is noteworthy: many panelists earn
substantial amounts on credit card float, and/
or forgo substantial interest by holding large
checking balances.
III. Avoidable Costs: Choices at the Point of Sale
and Reallocation of Funds

In principle, nearly all of the costs described
above are avoidable if consumers make different
long-run decisions (e.g., to reduce consumption
in order to repay credit card debt).
Here we examine narrower questions: what
share of these costs could be avoided, conditional on the set of purchase transactions and
the payment choice set? What share of costs
might be avoided simply by using the lowestcost payment method? A related question is
how much consumers could save by reallocating dollars from high-cost accounts to low-cost
accounts.
For checking accounts, any implicit interest
costs could be avoided by costlessly sweeping
funds into an interest-bearing account or paying down high-interest credit. That is an aggressive assumption, but given interest in household
“borrowing high and lending low,” it is informative as an upper bound on avoidable costs
(Zinman 2007).
We also classify some overdraft fees as
avoidable. If a consumer overdrafts but holds
sufficient available funds in another checking
account, or sufficient available credit on a credit
card, we measure that fee as avoidable. For the
time being, we ignore the cost of using the alternative payment method (e.g., the interest cost of
charging instead of bouncing a check). In most
cases those costs are less than a dollar (versus
$25 for overdrafting).
On credit card accounts, we classify interest charges as avoidable if revolving balances
could be repaid using available checking funds.
We make that calculation day by day. We also
classify interest charges as avoidable if revolving balances could be shifted onto lower-rate
credit cards already held by the panelist (this
could have been done ex ante, by choosing a
different card at the point-of-sale, or ex post, by
allocating payments to more expensive cards).
That calculation is also day by day. For now, we
assume that the consumer faces no credit limit
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at the lowest available credit card interest rate;
we will relax that assumption in future work.
Some credit card fees are avoidable too. Late
fees are avoidable if the panelist’s minimum
available checking balance during the billing
period exceeds the minimum payment on the
credit card (i.e., on this component we err on the
side of classifying more fees as unavoidable).
Overlimit fees are avoidable if the transaction
that generated the overlimit fee could have been
made using a debit card or another credit card.
Cash advance fees are avoidable if the value of
the advance is less than the panelist’s minimum
checking account balance during the month
(again, we err on the side of classifying more
fees as unavoidable).
Table 1 contains some estimates of avoidable
costs. The top row shows that in the median
panelist-month, 60 percent of costs could be
avoided. At the seventy-fifth percentile nearly
all costs could be avoided. Interest paid is less
avoidable by our metrics than penalty fees,
nearly all of which appear to be avoidable.
These results are striking for at least two reasons. First, our measure of avoidable interest
costs is on the high side (i.e., closer to an upper
bound), and our measure of avoidable penalty
fees is on the low side (i.e., closer to a lower
bound). This strengthens the inference that most
penalty fees are avoidable with small changes in
short-run behavior, while most interest charges
are not. Second, recall that we likely have a relatively financially sophisticated sample. If avoidable penalty fees are prominent in this sample,
they may be even more prominent in the general
population.
IV. Persistence of Costs at the Panelist Level

The last part of Table 1 reports the average
within-panelist month-to-month correlation in
costs and avoidable costs. Again there is a wide
range of heterogeneity in the persistence of total
costs and its components. The interquartile range
of total costs persistence is [0.01, 0.56], with a
median of 0.29. Interest and avoidable interest
are fairly persistent, penalty fees are not generally persistent. Perhaps most interestingly, there
is great heterogeneity in the (lack of) persistence
in avoidable fees. Many consumers pay nearly
the same avoidable amount every month, e.g.,
the ninetieth percentile of those with nonzero
fees is a month-to-month correlation of 0.8. But
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many other consumers show little persistence:
the median correlation is zero, which means that
month-to-month avoidable fees are negatively
correlated for nearly half of our panelists.

Agarwal, Sumit, John Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix,
and David Laibson. 2008. “Learning in the

V. Conclusion

Carroll, Christopher D. 2001. “A Theory of the

We present several new stylized facts on what
people actually pay to use their checking and
credit card accounts. Our median household
pays $500 per year and could avoid more than
half these costs with minor changes in behavior.
Translating these avoidable costs into consumption terms, we find that most consumers could
afford to borrow more than 1,000 additional
dollars simply by allocating payment choices
more efficiently. Penalty fees are economically important (representing about half of total
fees, and the lion’s share of checking account
costs), and most penalty fees are easily avoidable by our metrics. Interest and avoidable interest generally persist over time; in contrast, fee
and avoidable fee costs are negatively correlated
over time for many consumers. On all margins
of costs and cost persistence, we find tremendous heterogeneity.
We leave the many questions about what
drives these outcomes for future research in
consumer choice, strategic pricing, and equilibrium household finance.
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